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ABSTRACT 
Security of computers and the networks that connect them is increasingly becoming of great significance. Computer 
security is defined as the protection of computing systems against threats to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
There are two types of intruders: the external intruders who are unauthorized users of the machines they attack, and 
internal intruders, who have permission to access the system with some restrictions. Due to the fact that it is more and 
more improbable to a system administrator to recognize and manually intervene to stop an attack, there is an increasing 
recognition that ID systems should have a lot to earn on following its basic principles on the behavior of complex natural 
systems, namely in what refers to self-organization, allowing for a real distributed and collective perception of this 
phenomena. Having that aim in mind, the present work presents a self-organized ant colony based intrusion detection 
system (ANTIDS) to detect intrusions in a network infrastructure. The performance is compared among conventional soft 
computing paradigms like Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines and Linear Genetic Programming to model fast, 
online and efficient intrusion detection systems.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for sign 
of intrusions is known as Intrusion detection. Intrusion detection is classified into two types: misuse intrusion 
detection and anomaly intrusion detection. Misuse intrusion detection uses well-defined patterns of the attack 
that exploit weaknesses in system and application software to identify the intrusions. These patterns are 
encoded in advance and used to match against the user behavior to detect intrusion. Anomaly intrusion 
detection uses the normal usage behavior patterns to identify the intrusion. The behavior of the user is 
observed and any deviation from the constructed normal behavior is detected as intrusion. We have two 
options to secure the system completely, either prevent the threats and vulnerabilities which come from flaws 
in the operating system as well as in the application programs or detect them and take some action to prevent 
them in future and also repair the damage. It is impossible in practice, and even if possible, extremely 
difficult and expensive, to write a completely secure system. Transition to such a system for use in the entire 
world would be an equally difficult task. Cryptographic methods can be compromised if the passwords and 
keys are stolen. No matter how secure a system is, it is vulnerable to insiders who abuse their privileges. 
There is an inverse relationship between the level of access control and efficiency. More access controls 
make a system less user-friendly and more likely of not being used.  
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a program that analyzes what happens or has happened during an 
execution and tries to find indications that the computer has been misused. An Intrusion detection system 
does not eliminate the use of preventive mechanism but it works as the last defensive mechanism in securing 
the system. Data mining approaches for intrusion detection were first implemented in mining audit data for 
automated models for intrusion detection [3,23,8].. Several data mining algorithms are applied to audit data 
to compute models that accurately capture the actual behavior of intrusions as well as normal activities [29]. 
Audit data analysis and mining combine the association rules and classification algorithm to discover attacks 
in audit data.  
On the other hand, and due to the fact that it is more and more improbable to a system administrator to 
recognize and manually intervene to stop an attack (an option only possible in small scale networks) without 
harming too much the integrity of the overall system, there is an increasing recognition that ID systems 
should have a lot to earn on following its basic principles on the behavior of complex natural systems, 
namely in what refers to self-organization. Due to their nature, self-organizing complex adaptive systems 
typically are comprised of a large number of frequently similar components (e.g. agents) or events. Through 
their process, a pattern at the global-level of a system emerges solely from numerous interactions among the 
lower-level components [31,35]. Moreover, the rules specifying interactions among the system’s components 
are executed using only local information, without reference to the global pattern, which, as in many real-
world problems is not easily accessible or possible to be found, as in our IDS present case. Stigmergy 
[34,33,2], a kind of indirect communication and learning by the environment found in social insects is a well 
know example of self-organization, providing not only vital clues in order to understand how the components 
can interact to produce a complex pattern, as can pinpoint simple biological non-linear rules and methods to 
achieve improved artificial intelligent adaptive categorization systems, critical for collective perception and 
recognition. In fact, their distributed bottom-up emergent nature, along with their massively implicit parallel 
properties and the fact that there is no need of a global top-down hierarchical supervisor, makes them ideal 
candidates for ID systems and to be embedded on-line in complex large scale computer network infrastruc-
tures, where traditional security mechanisms demonstrate severe weaknesses [25]. Some works have already 
been presented along these lines. Recently, Foukia et al [16] designed an IR (Intrusion Response) system 
cooperating with an IDS using mobile agents distributed throughout the network, based on stigmergic 
properties. In other works [14,11], detection was based on artificial immune systems [10] where ID agents 
map the functionalities of the natural immune system to distinguish between normal and abnormal events 
(respectively “self” and “non self” in the immune system) as explained in [17,18]. 
Precisely on the context of adopting complex adaptive systems into ID systems, the present work 
introduces a self-organized ant colony based intrusion detection system (ANTIDS) to detect intrusions and 
compares its performance with Linear Genetic Programming (LGP) [5], Support Vector Machines (SVM)  
[38] and Decision Trees (DT) [6]. Other past works have made use of Multiple Adaptive Regression Splines 
(MARS) [28]. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some related research in 
intrusion detection systems using data mining paradigms. The technical details of the ANT colony algorithm 
are presented in Section 3 followed by the importance of attribute or feature reduction in Section 4. 
Experiment results are presented in Section 5 and some conclusions are also provided towards the end. 
2. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM – A DATA MINING APPROACH 
Data mining is a relatively new approach for intrusion detection. Data mining approaches for intrusion 
detection was first implemented in Mining Audit Data for Automated Models for Intrusion Detection [26]. 
The raw data is first converted into ASCII network packet information which in turn is converted into 
connection level information. These connection level records contain within connection features like service, 
duration, etc. Data mining algorithms are applied to this data to create models to detect intrusions. 
2.1   Linear Genetic Programming (LGP) 
Linear genetic programming is a variant of the GP technique that acts on linear genomes. Its main 
characteristics in comparison to tree-based GP lies in that the evolvable units are not the expressions of a 
functional programming language (like LISP), but the programs of an imperative language (like c/c ++) [5]. 
The basic unit of evolution here is a native machine code instruction that runs on the floating-point processor 
unit (FPU). Since different instructions may have different sizes, here instructions are clubbed up together to 
form instruction blocks of 32 bits each. The instruction blocks hold one or more native machine code 
instructions, depending on the sizes of the instructions. A crossover point can occur only between 
instructions and is prohibited from occurring within an instruction. However the mutation operation does not 
have any such restriction. In this research, steady state genetic programming approach was used to manage 
the memory more effectively. 
2.2   Decision Trees (DT)  
Intrusion detection can be considered as classification problem where each connection or user is identified 
either as one of the attack types or normal based on some existing data. Decision trees work well with large 
data sets. This is important as large amounts of data flow across computer networks. The high performance 
of Decision trees makes them useful in real-time intrusion detection. Decision trees construct easily 
interpretable models, which is useful for a security officer to inspect and edit. These models can also be used 
in the rule-based models with minimum processing [6]. Generalization accuracy of decision trees is another 
useful property for intrusion detection model. There will always be some new attacks on the system, which 
are small variations of known attacks after the intrusion detection models are built. The ability to detect these 
new intrusions is possible due to the generalization accuracy of decision trees.  
2.3   Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
Support Vector Machines have been proposed as a novel technique for intrusion detection. SVM maps input 
(real-valued) feature vectors into a higher dimensional feature space through some nonlinear mapping. SVMs 
are powerful tools for providing solutions to classification, regression and density estimation problems. 
These are developed on the principle of structural risk minimization. Structural risk minimization seeks to 
find a hypothesis h for which one can find lowest probability of error. The structural risk minimization can be 
achieved by finding the hyper plane with maximum separable margin for the data [38].  Computing the hyper 
plane to separate the data points i.e. training a SVM leads to quadratic optimization problem. SVM uses a 
feature called kernel to solve this problem. Kernel transforms linear algorithms into nonlinear ones via a map 
into feature spaces. SVMs classify data by using these support vectors, which are members of the set of 
training inputs that outline a hyper plane in feature space. 
3.   BIO-INSPIRED SELF-ORGANIZED ANT-BASED CLUSTERING 
Data Mining is precisely one of those problems in which real ants can suggest very interesting heuristics for 
computer scientists [31], namely for clustering purposes. One of the first studies using the metaphor of ant 
colonies related to the above clustering domain is due to Deneubourg [9], where a population of ant-like 
agents randomly moving onto a 2D grid are allowed to move basic objects so as to cluster them. This method 
was then further generalized by Lumer and Faieta [24] (here after LF algorithm), applying it to exploratory 
data analysis, for the first time. In 1995, the two authors were then beyond the simple example, and applied 
their algorithm to interactive exploratory database analysis, where a human observer can probe the contents 
of each represented point (sample, image, item) and alter the characteristics of the clusters. They showed that 
their model provides a way of exploring complex information spaces, such as document or relational 
databases, because it allows information access based on exploration from various perspectives. However, 
this last work entitled “Exploratory Database Analysis via Self-Organization”, according to [4], was never 
published due to commercial applications. They applied the algorithm to a database containing the “profiles” 
of 1650 bank customers. Attributes of the profiles included marital status, gender, residential status, age, a 
list of banking services used by the customer, etc. Given the variety of attributes, some of them qualitative 
and others quantitative, they had to define several dissimilarity measures for the different classes of 
attributes, and to combine them into a global dissimilarity measure (in, pp. 163, Chapter 4 [4]). More 
recently, Ramos et al. [34,33,35] presented a novel strategy (ACLUSTER) to tackle unsupervised clustering as 
well as data retrieval problems, avoiding not only short-term memory based strategies, as well as the use of 
several artificial ant types (using different speeds), present in those approaches proposed initially by Lumer 
[24]. Other works in this area include those from Monmarché et al. [27], Ramos, Merelo et al. [35,33,34,31], 
Handl and Dorigo [19], Ramos and Abraham [32,2]. 
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Algorithm. High-level description of ACLUSTER. 
 
/* Initialization */ 
For every object or data-item oi do 
Place oi randomly on grid 
End For 
For all agents do 
Place agent at randomly selected site 
End For 
 
/* Main loop */ 
For t = 1 to tmax do 
For all agents do 
sum = 0 
Count the number of items n around site r 
 
If ((agent unladen) & (site r occupied by item oi)) then 
For all sites around r with items present do 
/* According to Eqs. 4, 6, 7 and 8 */ 
Compute d,c, e and Pp 
Draw a random real number R between 0 and 1 
If (R = Pp) then 
sum = sum + 1 
End If 
End For 
If ((sum = n/2) or (n = 0)) then 
Pick up item oi 
End If 
Else If ((agent carrying item oi) & (site r empty)) then 
For all sites around r with items present do 
/* According to Eqs. 4, 5, 7 and 8 */ 
Compute d,c, d and Pd 
Draw random real number R between 0 and 1 
If (R = Pd) then 
sum = sum + 1 
End If 
End For 
If (sum = n/2) then 
Drop item oi 
End If 
End If 
 
/* According to Eqs. 1 and 2 (section 3.1) */ 
Compute W(s) and Pik 
Move to a selected r not occupied by other agent 
Count the number of items n around that new site r 
Increase pheromone at site r according to n, that is:  
Pr= Pr+[h+(n/a)] 
End For 
Evaporate pheromone by K, at all grid sites 
End For 
Print location of items 
 
/* Values of parameters used in experiments */ 
k1 = 0.1, k2 = 0.3, K = 0.015, h = 0.07, a = 400,  
b=3.5,  ?=0.2, tmax = 106 steps. 
 
Fig. 1 – From a1) to a4), a sequential clustering task of corpses 
performed by a real ant colony. 1500 corpses are randomly located 
in a circular arena with radius = 25 cm, where Messor Sancta ant 
workers are present. The figure shows the initial state (a1), 2 hours 
(a2), 6 hours (a3) and 26 hours (a4) after the beginning of the 
experiment [4]. In b1-b4, some experiments with the present 
algorithm, conducted on synthetic data (as in [33,24]). Spatial 
distribution of 800 items on a 57 x 57 non-parametric toroidal grid at 
several time steps. At t=1, four types of items are randomly allocated 
into the grid. As time evolves, several homogenous clusters emerge 
due to the ant colony action, and as expected the global entropy 
decreases [34]. 
 
3.1   Distributed, Collaborative and Stigmergic Clustering 
The swarm intelligence algorithm (see fig. 1) fully uses agents that stochastically move around the 
classification “habitat” following pheromone concentrations.  That is, instead of trying to solve some 
disparities in the basic LF algorithm by adding different ant casts, short-term memories and behavioral 
switches, which are computationally intensive, representing simultaneously a potential and difficult complex 
parameter tuning, it was our intention to follow real ant-like behaviors as possible (some other features will 
be incorporated, as the use of different response thresholds to task-associated stimulus intensities, discussed  
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later). In that sense, bio-inspired spatial transition probabilities are incorporated into the system, avoiding 
randomly moving agents, which tend the distributed algorithm to explore regions manifestly without interest 
(e.g., regions without any type of object clusters), being generally, this type of exploration, counterproductive 
and time consuming. Since this type of transition probabilities depend on the spatial distribution of 
pheromone across the environment, the behavior reproduced is also a stigmergic one [34,9]. Moreover, the 
strategy not only allows to guide ants to find clusters of objects in an adaptive way (if, by any reason, one 
cluster disappears, pheromone tends to evaporate on that location), as the use of embodied short-term 
memories is avoided (since this transition probabilities tends also to increase pheromone in specific locations, 
where more objects are present). As we shall see, the distribution of the pheromone represents the memory of 
the recent history of the swarm, and in a sense it contains information which the individual ants are unable to 
hold or transmit. There is no direct communication between the organisms but a type of indirect 
communication through the pheromonal field. In fact, ants are not allowed to have any memory and the 
individual’s spatial knowledge is restricted to local information about the whole colony pheromone density. 
In order to design this behavior, one simple model was adopted [7], and extended (as in [35,33]) due to 
specific constraints of the present proposal. As described in [7], the state of an individual ant can be 
expressed by its position r, and orientation q.  It is then sufficient to specify a transition probability from one 
place and orientation (r,q) to the next (r*,q*) an instant later. The response function can effectively be 
translated into a two-parameter transition rule between the cells by use of a pheromone weighting function 
(Eq. 1). This equation measures the relative probabilities of moving to a cite r (in our context, to a grid 
location) with pheromone density s(r). The parameter b is associated with the osmotropotaxic sensitivity (a 
kind of instantaneous pheromonal gradient following), and on the other hand, 1/d is the sensory capacity, 
which describes the fact that each ant’s ability to sense pheromone decreases somewhat at high 
concentrations. In addition to the former equation, there is a weighting factor w(Dq), where Dq is the change 
in direction at each time step, i.e. measures the magnitude of the difference in orientation. As an additional 
condition, each individual leaves a constant amount h of pheromone at the cell in which it is located at every 
time step t. This pheromone decays at each time step at a rate k. Then, the normalised transition probabilities 
on the lattice to go from cell k to cell i are given by Pik  [7] (Eq. 2),  where the notation j/k indicates the sum 
over all the pixels j which are in the local neighborhood of k. Finally, Di measures the magnitude of the 
difference in orientation for the previous direction at time t-1. 
3.2   Picking and Dropping Data Objects 
In order to model the behavior of ants associated to different tasks, as dropping and picking up objects, other 
works [33] suggest the use of combinations of different response thresholds. As we have seen before, there 
are two major factors that should influence any local action taken by the ant-like agent: the number of objects 
in his neighborhood, and their similarity (including the hypothetical object carried by one ant). Lumer and 
Faieta [24], use an average similarity, mixing distances between objects with their number, incorporating it 
simultaneously into a response threshold function. Instead, we recommend the use of combinations of two 
independent response threshold functions, each associated with a different environmental factor (or, stimuli 
intensity), that is, the number of objects in the area, and their similarity. 
Moreover, the computation of average similarities are avoided in the present algorithm, since this strategy 
can be somehow blind to the number of objects present in one specific neighborhood. In fact, in Lumer and 
Faieta’s work [24], there is an hypothetical chance of having the same average similarity value, respectively 
having one or, more objects present in that region. But, experimental evidences and observation in some 
types of ant colonies can provide us with a different answer. After Wilson (The Insect Societies, Cambridge 
Press, 1971), it is known that minors and majors in the polymorphic species of ants Genus Pheidole, have 
different response thresholds to task-associated stimulus intensities (i.e., division of labor). Recently, and 
inspired by this experimental evidence, Bonabeau et al. [4], proposed a family of response threshold 
functions  in order to model  this behavior. According  to it, every individual  has a response threshold q  for  
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every task. Individuals engage in task performance when the level of the task-associated stimuli s, exceeds 
their thresholds. Author’s defined s as the intensity of a stimulus associated with a particular task, i.e. s can 
be a number of encounters, a chemical concentration, or any quantitative cue sensed by individuals. One 
family of response functions Tq (s) (the probability of performing the task as a function of stimulus intensity 
s), that satisfy this requirement is given by (Eq. 3) [4], where n>1 determines the steepness of the threshold 
(normally n=2, but similar results can be obtained with other values of n>1). Now, at s = q , this probability 
is exactly ½. Therefore, individuals with a lower value of q are likely to respond to a lower level of stimulus. 
In order to take account on the number of objects present in one neighborhood, Eq. 13, was used (where, n 
now stands for the number of objects present in one neighborhood, and q = 5), defining c (Eq. 4) as the 
response threshold associated to the number of items present in a 3 x 3 region around r (one specific grid 
location). Now, in order to take account on the hypothetical similarity between objects, and in each ant action 
due to this factor, a Euclidean normalized distance d is computed within all the pairs of objects present in that 
3 x 3 region around r. Being a and b, a pair of objects, and fa(i), fb(i) their respective feature vectors (being 
each object defined by F features), then d = (1/dmax).[(1/F).åi=1,F(fa(i)-fb(i))2]½. Clearly, this distance d reaches 
its maximum (=1, since d is normalized by dmax) when two objects are maximally different, and d=0 when 
they are equally defined by the same F features. Moreover, d and e (Eqs. 5,6), are respectively defined as the 
response threshold functions associated to the similarity of objects, in case of dropping an object (Eq. 5), and 
picking it up (Eq. 6), at site r. Finally, in every action taken by an agent, and in order to deal, and represent 
different stimulus intensities (number of items and their similarity), present at each site in the environment 
visited by one ant, the strategy uses a composition of the above defined response threshold functions (Eqs. 
4,5 and 6). Several composed probabilities were analyzed [33] and used as test functions in one preliminary 
test. The best results were achieved with the test function #1 below (Eqs. 7,8), achieving a high classification 
rate (out of 4 different functions were used, as well the LF algorithm [24]; for comparison reasons – see 
[34,33]). Alternatively, the system can also be robust feeding the data continuously (for instance, as they 
appear) as proved in past works [32]. For other algorithm details please consult [33,34,35]. 
4.   ATTRIBUTE REDUCTION IN INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Complex relationships exist between features, which are difficult for humans to discover. IDS must therefore 
reduce the amount of data to be processed. This is very important if real-time detection is desired. The easiest 
way to do this is by doing an intelligent input feature selection. Certain features may contain false 
correlations, which hinder the process of detecting intrusions. Further, some features may be redundant since 
the information they add is contained in other features. Extra features can increase computation time, and can 
impact the accuracy of IDS. Feature selection improves classification by searching for the subset of features, 
which best classifies the training data.  
Feature selection is done based on the contribution the input variables made to the construction of the 
decision tree. Feature importance is determined by the role of each input variable either as a main splitter or 
as a surrogate. Surrogate splitters are defined as back-up rules that closely mimic the action of primary 
splitting rules. Suppose that, in a given model, the algorithm splits data according to variable ‘protocol_type’ 
and if a value for ‘protocol_type’ is not available, the algorithm might substitute ‘flag’ as a good surrogate. 
Variable importance, for a particular variable is the sum across all nodes in the tree of the improvement 
scores that the predictor has when it acts as a primary or surrogate (but not competitor) splitter. Example, for 
node i, if the predictor appears as the primary splitter then its contribution towards importance could be given 
as iimportance. But if the variable appears as the nth surrogate instead of the primary variable, then the 
importance becomes iimportance = (pn) * iimprovement in which p is the ‘surrogate improvement weight’ which is a 
user controlled parameter set between (0-1).  
In order to reduce the number of features or pinpoint those that are relevant, other methods could of course 
be used, as Principal Component Analysis (PCA, [20]). Other possibility, is not only to try to reduce the 
number of features as at the same time, trying to increase the recognition rate, which conducts us to a multi-
modal optimization problem. A successful method using Genetic Algorithms (Evolutionary Computation) 
was designed earlier by Ramos and Pina [36], in order to classify 187 images (each described by 117 
Mathematical Morphology [36] features) from 14 classical types of Portuguese granites. Their method not 
only increased the recognition rate to 100% as features were reduced from 117 to 3, representing 
simultaneously a robust strategy in order to understand the proper nature of the images treated, and their 
discriminant features. 
5.    EXPERIMENT SETUP AND RESULTS 
The data for our experiments was prepared by the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation program by 
MIT Lincoln Labs [26]. The LAN was operated like a real environment, but was blasted with multiple 
attacks. For each TCP/IP connection, 41 various quantitative and qualitative features were extracted. The 
data set has 41 attributes or features for each connection record plus one class label as given in table 1. The 
data set contains 24 attack types that could be classified into four main categories Attack types fall into four 
main categories: DoS: Denial of Service - Denial of Service (DoS) is a class of attack where an attacker 
makes a computing or memory resource too busy or too full to handle legitimate requests, thus denying 
legitimate users access to a machine; R2L: Unauthorized Access from a Remote Machine - A remote to 
user (R2L) attack is a class of attack where an attacker sends packets to a machine over a network, then 
exploits the machine’s vulnerability to illegally gain local access as a user; U2Su: Unauthorized Access to 
Local Super User (root) - User to root (U2Su) exploits are a class of attacks where an attacker starts out 
with access to a normal user account on the system and is able to exploit vulnerability to gain root access to 
the system; Probing: Surveillance and Other Probing - Probing is a class of attack where an attacker scans 
a network to gather information or find known vulnerabilities. An attacker with a map of machines and 
services that are available on a network can use the information to look for exploits. 
Our experiments had three conventional phases namely input feature reduction, training phase and testing 
phase, namely for the conventional soft-computing paradigms DT, SVM and LGP. An exception is done for 
ANTIDS as we will see in the next paragraph. In the data reduction phase, important variables for real-time 
intrusion detection are selected by feature selection. In the training phase, the different soft computing 
models were constructed using the training data to give maximum generalization accuracy on the unseen 
data. The test data is then passed through the saved trained model to detect intrusions in the testing phase. 
The 41 features are labeled as shown in table 1 and the class label is named as AP. This data set has five 
different classes namely Normal, DoS, R2L, U2R and Probes. The training and test comprises of 5092 and 
6890 records respectively [22]. Using all 41 variables could result in a big IDS model, which could be an 
overhead for online detection. All the training data were scaled to (0-1). The decision tree approach described 
in Section 4 helped us to reduce the number of variables to 12 variables. The list of reduced variables is 
illustrated in table 2. Using the original and reduced data sets, we performed a 5-class classification. The 
normal data belongs to class 1, probe belongs to class 2, denial of service belongs to class 3, user to super 
user belongs to class 4, remote to local belongs to class 5. All the IDS models are trained and tested with the 
same set of data. 
The settings of various linear genetic programming system parameters are of utmost importance for 
successful performance of the system [1]. The population size was set at 120,000 and a tournament size of 8 
is used for all the 5 classes. Crossover and mutation probability is set at 65-75% and 75-86% respectively for 
the different classes. Our trial experiments with SVM revealed that the polynomial kernel option often 
performs well on most of the datasets. We also constructed decision trees using the training data and then 
testing data was passed through the constructed classifier to classify the attacks [30]. The ANTIDS 
experimental setup  took  however a  different  path,  since it  is  in  his underneath  essence an unsupervised  
Table 1. Variables for intrusion detection data set 
 
Variable No. Variable name Variable type Variable label 
1 duration continuous A 
2 protocol_type discrete B 
3 service discrete C 
4 flag discrete D 
5 src_bytes continuous E 
6 dst_bytes continuous F 
7 land discrete G 
8 wrong_fragment continuous H 
9 urgent continuous I 
10 hot continuous J 
11 num_failed_logins continuous K 
12 logged_in discrete L 
13 num_compromised continuous M 
14 root_shell continuous N 
15 su_attempted continuous O 
16 num_root continuous P 
17 num_file_creations continuous Q 
18 num_shells continuous R 
19 num_access_files continuous S 
20 num_outbound_cmds continuous T 
21 is_host_login discrete U 
22 is_guest_login discrete V 
23 count continuous W 
24 srv_count continuous X 
25 serror_rate continuous Y 
26 srv_serror_rate continuous X 
27 rerror_rate continuous AA 
28 srv_rerror_rate continuous AB 
29 same_srv_rate continuous AC 
30 diff_srv_rate continuous AD 
31 srv_diff_host_rate continuous AE 
32 dst_host_count continuous AF 
33 dst_host_srv_count continuous AG 
34 dst_host_same_srv_rate continuous AH 
35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate continuous AI 
36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate continuous AJ 
37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate continuous AK 
38 dst_host_serror_rate continuous AL 
39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate continuous AM 
40 dst_host_rerror_rate continuous AN 
41 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate continuous AO 
Table 2. Reduced variable set 
C,  E,  F,  L,  W,  X,  Y,  AB,  AE,  AF,  AG,  AI 
 
process. After feature extraction and reduction (section 4), those values described in table 1 were subjected to 
normalization. This normalization is based on the computation of max and min values for each of the 41 
features. Then, each feature value (over 11982 samples) are normalized into the interval [0, 1], in order to be 
  
a) t=1 b) t=1x106 
  
c) t=1 d) t=1x106 
Fig.2 – Ant-like clustering results on IDS data using the a-b) full data set (with 41 features) and c-d) the reduced 
data set (12 features), at t=1and t=1x106. For the purpose of reader transparency, in all diagrams class 1 to 5 was 
respectively represented by ¢, £, , , and finally by Ê (training samples in blue; testing samples in black). 
  
a) t=1 b) t=10000 
  
c) t=1 d) t=10000 
Fig.3 – Other experiments included the initial random allocation of marker items into specified zones. 
 
randomly introduced in the  algorithm  described in section  3. In our case, each object (each ID sample) 
manipulated by the artificial ant colony is represent by a feature vector composed of 41 elements or 12 
elements, depending if we instead use the reduced data set (table 2). 
Based on self-organizing these objects in a non-parametrical toroidal 2-D space, the unsupervised 
clustering proceeds for t = 1 x 106 time steps. After the unsupervised and self-organized clustering process is 
finished (fig. 2) - with 11982 samples x 41 (12) features each –, the first 5092 samples are used as markers or 
reference points (blue markers in fig. 2), and via k-NNR nearest neighbor rule classification [11,13] the 
remaining 6890 samples (black markers in fig. 2) are classified (we used k = 3 neighbors; k must be always 
an odd number). In order to do so, for each sample i = 6890, …,11982, we computed their first k = 3 marker 
neighbors on this non-parametric toroidal 2-D space. An algorithm to find the first k neighbors in a toroidal 
space can however be largely tricky. Our idea was to use 8 virtual spaces (windows) around the one we see in 
fig. 2, copying to each one of them, all the respective reference markers to be used in the normal k-NNR and 
finally computing the geographical vicinity in this large virtual space for each one of the testing samples only 
present in the central window. The majority of those marker label values - considered for each still 
unclassified sample - give them the respective final classification result.  
Two experimental setups were then tested. The first one (ANTIDS-a) used self-organization in order to 
cluster all the 11982 samples at once (5092 training + 6890 testing samples). In ANTIDS-b, however, we 
process and treat parts and streams of data independently, set after set. In this framework, we use always the 
full markers set (5092 training samples) plus only a part of the testing set (1000 samples each time). That is, 
we had to make six runs with 1000 testing samples and the 7th final one with 890 testing samples. Final 
results are presented in tables 3 and 4. For any of these cases, the final self-organized stigmergic map [34] 
achieved is highly robust. If for example, we use k = 1 in the finally k-NNR classification, which normally is 
not prudent, we also arrive at similar recognition rates. 
Table 3. Performance comparison using full data set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Performance comparison using reduced data set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other experiments included the initial random allocation of marker items into specified zones (fig. 3). In a) 
marker samples (training data set for the subsequent k-NNR classification; in blue) are randomly allocated in 
5 box zones corresponding to samples from class 1 to 5 (class 1 in the bottom-left corner; other classes 
distributed clockwise), while testing samples are allocated everywhere in this toroidal classification space. 
These marker samples, however, can now be translated to new places if any ant-like agent wishes to do so, in 
Classification accuracy on test data set (%) Attack 
type 
ANTIDS-a ANTIDS-b DT SVM LGP 
Normal 70.52 99.64 99.64 99.64 99.73 
Probe 71.73 98.29 99.86 98.57 99.89 
DOS 83.39 99.98 96.83 99.92 99.95 
U2R 0.00 64.00 68.00 40.00 64.00 
R2L 10.47 99.47 84.19 33.92 99.47 
Classification accuracy on test data set (%) Attack 
type 
ANTIDS-a ANTIDS-b DT SVM LGP 
Normal 69.40 99.71 100.00 99.75 99.97 
Probe 60.07 99.86 97.71 98.20 99.93 
DOS 84.31 99.98 85.34 98.89 99.96 
U2R 47.62 68.00 64.00 59.00 68.26 
R2L 87.63 99.47 95.56 56.00 99.98 
order to proceed the unsupervised clustering. In c) marker samples are randomly allocated into 10 vertical 
stripes (2 for each class). In b-d) corresponding results at t=10000. Both strategies however, conducts us to 
meagre recognition rates in the interval [40-72%], for each class, after finally using k-NNR (k=1,3) at 
t=1x106.  For the purpose of reader transparency, in all diagrams class 1 to 5 was respectively represented by 
¢, £, , , and finally by Ê (training samples in blue; testing samples in black). For comparison purposes 
various other results were adapted from [1,30]. A number of observations and conclusions are drawn from 
the results illustrated in tables 3 and 4. Using 12 attributes most of the classifiers performed very well. 
6.    CONCLUSION 
As seen from results presented in tables 3 and 4 (section 5), the ANTIDS approach has several limitations in 
what refers to the final recognition rate, obtaining optimal results only for some cases. This is in part due to 
several reasons. First, the large number of samples used in the present study (a full data set of 11982 items) 
forces ACLUSTER algorithm to be run on a large toroidal space – empirical studies [35,34] shows that the 
optimal classification “habitat” area should be in the order of 4 times the number of objects, while the 
number of ants should be in the order of 1/10 of the number of objects. Rather, it’s by large preferably to 
process and treat parts and streams of data independently, set after set (check ANTIDS-b results). Second, 
and still in the present case, the data is poorly uniformly distributed between all the five classes. In fact, while 
some classes like class 3 (DOS) are represented by a sum of 3000 training and 4202 testing samples, a total 
of 7202 items (around 60% of our entire data set), other classes like class 4 (USR) are merely represented by 
a sum of 27 training and 25 testing samples, a total of 52 items (0.4% of our entire data set). In fact, the 
probability of one ant to encounter a class 3 sample in the toroidal classification space, process and treat it, is 
120 times bigger than to find one from class 4. This fact per si, can bias a lot our final results, since any self-
organizing mechanism depends a lot on a self-sufficient critical mass. Poorly represented classes have 
inadequately chances to be classified in a properly manner. It’s not surprising at all, that class 4 has the worst 
results for all methods used for comparison purposes.  
However, the self-organizing ID system has 4 major advantages in what refers to a comparison to their 
counterpart paradigms (DT, SVM, LGP), namely: (1) Classification can be processed online and in real time 
due to their distributed nature, as proved before with swarms nourished with continuous streams of data [32]. 
In fact, DT, SVM and LGP, as well as Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), have the inability to perform 
classification and visualization in a continuous basis or to self-organize new data-items into the older ones 
(even more into new labels if necessary), unless they re-start their learning process from the beginning, a 
characteristic which can be crucial to our purpose, producing class decisions on a continuous stream data, 
allowing for continuous mappings with open-ended innovation; (2) ANTIDS can deal with new classes 
whenever it’s needed without the need of retraining. In fact, stigmergy is often associated with flexibility: 
when the environment changes because of an external perturbation, the insects respond appropriately to that 
perturbation, as if it were a modification of the environment caused by the colony’s activities. In other words, 
the colony can collectively respond to the perturbation with individuals exhibiting the same behavior. When 
it comes to artificial agents, this type of flexibility is priceless: it means that the agents can respond to a 
perturbation without being reprogrammed to deal with that particular instability. In our context, this means 
that no classifier re-training is needed for any new sets of data-item types (new classes) arriving to the 
system, as is necessary in the DT, SVM and LGP models. Moreover, the data-items that were used for 
comparison purposes in early stages in the colony evolution in his exploration of the search-space, can now, 
along with new items, be re-arranged in more optimal ways. Classification and/or data retrieval remains the 
same, but the system re-organizes itself in order to deal with new classes or even new sub-classes. This task 
can be performed in real time, and in robust ways due to system’s redundancy; (3) the present algorithm can 
work either in unsupervised or supervised mode (adding the final k-NNR classification and using training 
samples as markers), and finally (4) The self-organizing nature of ANTIDS makes them an ideal candidate 
for ID systems. The present method shows how stigmergy can easily be made operational. Indeed, it is a 
promising first step to design groups of artificial agents which solve problems: replacing coordination (and 
possible some hierarchy) through direct communications by indirect interactions is appealing if one wishes to 
design simple agents and reduce communication among agents, in order to implant them on-line in complex 
large scale computer network infrastructures. 
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